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Abstract. In Quantitative Information Flow, refinement (v) expresses the strong
property that one channel never leaks more than another. Since two channels are
then typically incomparable, here we explore a family of refinement quasimetrics
offering greater flexibility. We show these quasimetrics let us unify refinement
and capacity, we show that some of them can be computed efficiently via linear
programming, and we establish upper bounds via the Earth Mover’s distance. We
illustrate our techniques on the Crowds protocol.
1 Introduction
Completely eliminating the leakage of sensitive information by computer systems is
often infeasible, making it attractive to approach the problem quantitatively. Quantita-
tive information flow [3] offers a rich family of g-leakage measures of the amount of
leakage caused by a channel C taking a secret input X to an observable output Y ; these
measures are parameterized by X’s prior distribution π and a gain function g, which
models the adversary’s capabilities and goals. (See §2 for a brief review.)
While g-leakage lets us precisely measure information leakage in a rich variety of
operational scenarios, we may be unsure about the appropriate prior π or gain func-
tion g to use, and hence about the robustness of our conclusions. Two approaches to
robustness have proved fruitful: capacity, which is the maximum leakage over some
sets of gain functions and priors, and refinement: channel A is refined by channel B,
written A v B, iff B never leaks more than A, regardless of the prior or gain function.
Remarkably, refinement also has a structural characterization: A v B iff there exists
a “post-processing” channel matrix R such that B = AR. Moreover, (v) is a partial
order on abstract channels.
Unfortunately, refinement is a very partial partial order, in that most channels are
incomparable. And this “Boolean” nature of refinement is inconsistent with the spirit
of quantitative information flow, which is above all motivated by the need to tolerate
imperfect security. If A 6v B, then we know that B can be worse than A; but we do not
know whether B is really terrible, or whether is is just slightly worse than A. This is the
main issue that we address in this paper.
In mathematics, it is common to use metrics to provide a “finer”, quantified gen-
eralization of a relation. A relation has a “Boolean” nature: elements are either related
or not. In the metric version, related elements have distance 0; but for non-related ele-
ments the metric tells you how much the relation is violated. For instance, the Euclidean
distance can be seen as a quantified generalization of the equality relation (=) on R —
the distance |x− y| tells us how much x = y is violated; 0 means that it is not violated
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at all.3 This approach is not of course limited to symmetric relations. For instance, the
quasimetric
q+<(x, y) := max{y − x, 0} ,
can be seen as a quantified version of (≥); it measures how much (≥) is violated, and
is 0 iff x ≥ y.
In this paper we define a family of refinement quasimetrics refqD,G to measure how
much refinement is violated. Refinement is then the kernel (i.e. elements at distance 0)
of these metrics: we have refqD,G(A,B) = 0 iff A v B. Through this approach, we make
the following contributions:
– We treat both additive and multiplicative leakage together via additive and multi-
plicative quasimetrics q+< and q
×
< . (The latter crucially takes the log of the ratio,
instead of just the ratio.)
– We observe that the capacity of C can be expressed as refqD,G(1,C), where 1 is
the perfect channel leaking nothing, giving us a unified way of looking at both
refinement and capacity.
– In §4 we show that, for a fixed prior π, the additive refinement metric over all gain
functions in GlX can be computed in polynomial time via linear programming.
– In §5 we prove (again for a fixed π) that the refinement metric is bounded by the
Earth Mover’s distance between [πŻA] and [πŻB], allowing it to be approximated
very efficiently. We also prove a bound on the metric over all priors.
– In §6 we give a case study of our techniques on the Crowds protocol.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantitative Information Flow
In quantitative information flow [6, 7, 9] an adversary’s prior knowledge about a secret
inputX drawn from a finite setX is modeled as a probability distribution π, and a prob-
abilistic system taking input X to observable output Y is modeled as an information-
theoretic channel matrix C giving the conditional probabilities p(y|x). Assuming that
the adversary knows C, then each output y allows the adversary to update her knowl-
edge about X to a posterior distribution pX|y , which moreover has probability p(y) of
occurring. As a result, the effect of C is to map each prior distribution π to a distribution
on posterior distributions, called a hyper-distribution and denoted [πŻC]. For example,
channel
C y1 y2 y3 y4
x1 1/2 1/2 0 0
x2 0 1/4 1/2 1/4
x3 1/2 1/3 1/6 0
maps π = (1/4, 1/2, 1/4) to hyper
[πŻC] 1/4 1/3 7/24 1/8
x1 1/2 3/8 0 0
x2 0 3/8 6/7 1
x3 1/2 1/4 1/7 0
.
3 Another example is bisimulation metrics for probabilistic properties. Because bisimulation is
a strong property that can be broken by tiny modifications to transition probabilities, a variety
of bisimulation metrics have been proposed, measuring how much bisimulation is violated.
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This mapping is called the abstract channel denoted by C.4
It is natural to measure the “vulnerability” ofX using functions Vg from probability
distributions to reals, which are parameterized with a gain function g : W × X → R
that models the operational scenario; hereW is the set of actions that the adversary can
make, and g(w, x) is the adversary’s gain for doing w when the secret’s actual value
is x. We then define the g-vulnerability by Vg(π) = supw
∑
x πxg(w, x), since that
is the maximum expected gain over all possible actions. The choice of g allows us to
model a wide variety of operational scenarios; a commonly used one is the identity gain
function, given byW = X and gid(w, x) = 1 iff w = x and 0 otherwise. For this gain
function Vgid(π) gives the probability of correctly guessing the secret in one try.
Posterior vulnerability is defined as the average g-vulnerability in the hyper distri-
bution: Vg[πŻC] =
∑
y p(y)Vg(pX|y). And then g-leakage is defined as either the ratio
or the difference between the posterior- and prior g-vulnerability; these are respectively
multiplicative leakage L×g (π,C) and additive leakage L+g (π,C).
2.2 Metrics
A proper metric on a setA is a function d : A→ [0,∞] satisfying the following axioms
for all x, y, z:A:
1. Reflexivity: d(x, x) = 0.
2. Symmetry: d(x, y) = d(y, x).
3. Anti-symmetry: d(x, y) = d(y, x) = 0⇒ x = y.5
4. Triangle inequality: d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z).
5. Finiteness: d(x, y) 6=∞.
Various prefixes can be added to “metric” to denote that some of the above conditions
are dropped. The following are used in this paper:
1. Quasi: symmetry is dropped.
2. Pseudo: anti-symmetry is dropped.
3. Extended: finiteness is dropped.
Any combination of these prefixes is meaningful. For brevity, we use “metric” to gen-
erally refer to any of these classes, while we use the exact prefixes (or “proper”) to refer
to a precise one.
Kernel. The kernel of a metric d is a relation, containing points at distance 0:
(x, y) ∈ ker(d) iff d(x, y) = 0 .
It is easy to see that the metric properties of d imply the corresponding homonymous
properties on relations for ker(d) (reflexivity, symmetry, anti-symmetry), while the tri-
angle inequality of d corresponds to transitivity for ker(d). Hence the kernel of a proper
4 Because of structural redundancies (e.g. the ordering and labels of columns), distinct channel
matrices may denote the same abstract channel.
5 When d is not symmetric, this is weaker than the axiom d(x, y) = 0 ⇒ x = y (which is
sometimes used in the literature even in the non-symmetric case).
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metric is always the equality relation =, the kernel of a pseudometric is an equivalence
relation (reflexive, symmetric and transitive), and the kernel of a quasimetric is a partial
order (reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive).
Quasimetrics on R,R≥0. On R the following quasimetric is of particular interest:
q+<(x, y) := max{y − x, 0} .
Intuitively, q+< measures (additively) “how much smaller” than y is x; 0 means that x is
“no smaller” than y. Or we can view q+< as measuring “how much x ≥ y is violated”;
0 means that x ≥ y holds (is not violated at all).
On R≥0 we can define a multiplicative variant of q+< as follows:6




with the understanding that q×<(0, y) = 0 iff y = 0 and ∞ otherwise (q×< is an ex-
tended quasimetric). Again, q×< measures “how much smaller” than y is x, but this
time multiplicatively. Although q+< and q
×




<) = ≥ .
Showing the quasimetric properties of q+< is trivial for all but the triangle inequality;
for the latter, assuming x ≤ z (the case x > z is trivial) we have that
q+<(x, z)
= z − x “x ≤ z”
= z − y + y − x
≤ max{z − y, 0}+max{y − x, 0}
= q+<(x, y) + q
+
<(y, z) .
Given a function f : B→A and metric d onA lets us define a metric d ◦ f on B by
(d ◦ f)(x, y):= d(f(x), f(y)).
Proposition 1. The composition d◦f always preserves all metric properties of d except
anti-symmetry, which is also preserved if f is injective.
This construction is useful in that q×< = q
+
< ◦ log2, from which it follows that q×< is an
extended quasimetric on R≥0.7
3 Refinement metrics
To design metrics for QIF, we start from the simple observation that we can compare
vulnerabilities using any (quasi) metric q on R≥0. For instance, leakage can be mea-
sured by comparing prior and posterior vulnerabilities as follows:
Lqg(π,C) := q(Vg(π), Vg[πŻC]) .
6 The use of logarithm is crucial for reflexivity and the triangle inequality. The choice of the
base is arbitrary, but log2 is interesting due to the connection with min-entropy.
7 Technically, to establish this we need to view q+< as an extended quasimetric on R ∪ {−∞}
and log2 as an injective function R≥0→ R ∪ {−∞}.
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The usual additive and multiplicative variants of leakage can be obtained by instantiat-
ing q by q+<,q
×





g (π,C) = L+g (π,C) , L
q×
<
g (π,C) = log2 L×g (π,C) .
The conceptual advantage of explicitly using a quasimetric (instead of just the differ-
ence or ratio) is twofold: first, we can exploit the metric properties of q and second, we
can treat both leakage variants together.
Continuing this line of reasoning, we can obtain a metric on channels, by using q to
compare their posterior vulnerabilities. This brings us to our refinement metric.
Definition 1. Given classes D ⊆ DX of distributions and G ⊆ GX of gain functions,




We write refqπ,G instead of ref
q
{π},G when D = {π}, and similarly for G.
Any metric could be meaningful for q (for instance symmetric ones). But here we
restrict to quasimetrics such that ker(q) = (≥), which we call order-respecting. The
standard choices of interest are q+< and q
×
< , giving additive and multiplicative compari-
son, for which we write the refinement metrics as ref+D,G and ref
×
D,G respectively. (Note
however that many results are independent of the choice of q.)
When D contains at least one point prior, or when G contains at least one constant
g, then the max in the definition of q+<,q
×










Intuitively, ref+D,G , ref
×
D,G measure (additively or multiplicatively) how robust it is
to replace A by B, with respect to the vulnerability of the system. A value of 0 means
no risk —B is never worse than A (for D,G)— while a positive value means that there
is risk, but it might be small. Note that refinement is asymmetric by design: replacing A
by B is inherently different than replacing B by A.
For fixed π and g, we can obtain refqπ,g as the composition
refqπ,g = q ◦ Vg[πŻ·] , (1)




This brings us to the following proposition.
8 This is reminiscent of min-entropy; conceptually, however, we did not use log2 to convert
vulnerabilities to entropies, we just used q×< to compare vulnerabilities via a metric of multi-
plicative nature (the log conveniently turns ratios into a metric).
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Proposition 2. refqD,G always inherits reflexivity, symmetry and the triangle inequality
from q, but not necessarily anti-symmetry and finiteness.
Proof. From (1) and Prop. 1 we get that refqπ,g inherits all metric properties of q except
anti-symmetry (Vg[πŻ·] is not injective). Then, from (2), we only need to show that the
sup of metrics preserves reflexivity, symmetry and the triangle inequality. The first two
are trivial; for the triangle inequality, let d = supi di, we have:
d(x, z)
= supi di(x, z)
≤ supi(di(x, y) + di(y, z)) “triangle ineq. for di”
≤ supi di(x, y) + supi di(y, z) “supi(ai + bi) ≤ supi ai + supi bi”
= d(x, y) + d(y, z) .
Clearly, anti-symmetry is not always preserved (take G to contain only constant gain
functions), nor is finiteness (for G = GX the sup can be∞ even if q itself is finite). 2
Hence ref+D,G and ref
×
D,G always satisfy reflexivity and the triangle inequality (i.e.
they are extended quasi pseudo metrics); they might satisfy additional properties for
specific choices of D and G.
3.1 Recovering the refinement relation
The following result states that if D and G are “sufficiently rich”, then we can obtain v
as the kernel of the corresponding refinement metric refqD,G .
Theorem 1. Assume that q is order-respecting, D contains a full-support prior, and G
contains the non-negative, 1-bounded gain functions with finitely many actions. Then
ker(refqD,G) = v .
Proof. (Sketch.) If A 6v B, then the proof of the Coriaceous Theorem [10, Thm. 9]
shows that for the uniform prior πu, there is a gain function g, restricted as in the state-
ment of the theorem, such that Vg[πuŻA] < Vg[πuŻB]; hence if q is order-respecting we
have refqπu,G(A,B) > 0. And by embedding the prior into g, we can replace π
u with
any full-support prior. 2
Hence the anti-symmetry of v on abstract channels is transferred to refqD,G :
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Thm. 1, refqD,G is anti-symmetric on abstract
channels.
3.2 Recovering capacity
Since the noninterfering channel 1 always produces a point hyper, capacity is simply
given by the corresponding refinement metric between 1 and C.




Proof. Direct consequence of the fact that Vg[πŻ1] = Vg(π). 2
Recall that using the quasimetrics ref+D,G or ref
×
D,G for q make ref
q
D,G itself non-
symmetric. In particular refqD,G(1,C) gives the capacity of C, while ref
q
D,G(C,1) is
always zero since C v 1.
A corollary of the above proposition is that the refinement metric of A,B can never
exceed the capacity of B. This is intuitive since refqD,G(A,B) measures “how much
worse than A can B be”, while the capacity measures “how much worse than 1 (the
best possible channel) can B be”.




Proof. We have that:
refqD,G(A,B)
≤ refqD,G(A,1) + ref
q





D,G(A,1) = 0 for order-respecting q”
= MLqG(D,B) “Prop. 3”
2
The above corollary in turn implies that refqD,G is finite whenever the capacity itself
is finite. In particular ref+D,Gl and ref
×
D,G+ are both finite.
4 Computing the additive refinement metric
Given channel matrices A:X_Y and B:X_Z where A 6v B, we know that sometimes
B leaks more than A. To determine how much worse B can be, we wish to compute
some version of the refinement metric: here we focus on the additive refinement metric
ref+π,Gl(A,B), which measures the maximum amount by which the additive leakage
of B can exceed that of A on prior π and over gain functions in GlX , the class of
1-bounded gain functions.9
It is known that we can do this computation via linear programming [4], where the
elements of G (the matrix representation of g) are variables. But here we refine the
previously-used approach, enabling it to be done far more efficiently than was previ-
ously known. First, to ensure that G is in GlX , we just need to constrain its entries to
be at most 1, and (to ensure that its gain values are non-negative) include a special ac-
tion⊥ whose gain values are all 0. A second issue is that the number of possible actions
of G is not fixed. But it suffices for G to have |Y| + |Z| + 1 actions, since this allows
9 These are the gain functions whose gain values are at most 1 and which always produce non-
negative vulnerabilities (even though some of their gain values can be negative). We need
to restrict to bounded gain functions to get interesting results, since otherwise we could get
arbitrarily large leakage differences simply by scaling up the gain values, making the additive
refinement metric infinite.
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a different action for each output of A and B, along with the special ⊥ action. Now we
recall the trace-based formulation of posterior vulnerability:
Vg[πŻA] = max
SA
tr(GDπASA) and Vg[πŻB] = max
SB
tr(GDπBSB)
where SA:Y_W and SB:Z_W are strategies mapping outputs of A and B to actions.
While the previously-used approach was to try exponentially-many strategies SA and
SB, we now argue that this is actually unnecessary. For we can assume without loss of
generality that the first |Y| rows of G contain, in order, optimal actions for the columns
of A; the next |Z| rows of G contain, in order, optimal actions for the columns of B; and
finally the last row of G is all 0, for the⊥ action. Achieving this just requires reordering
the rows of G and possibly duplicating some actions (since the same action might be
optimal for more than one column). Once this is done, we can use a fixed SA that maps
column j of A to row j of G, and a fixed SB that maps column k of B to row k+|Y| of
G. Now we can solve a single linear programming problem for that SA and SB:10
Choose G to maximize tr(GDπBSB)− tr(GDπASA) subject to G having ele-
ments of at most 1 and a final all-zero row, and opt (SA),
where opt (SA) constrains SA to be optimal for G. Remarkably, this means that a max-
imizing gain function G can be found in polynomial time.
Let us consider some examples. Consider the following channels:
A y1 y2 y3
x1 0.1 0.2 0.7
x2 0.3 0.5 0.2
x3 0.6 0.1 0.3
B y1 y2 y3
x1 0.101 0.200 0.699
x2 0.298 0.501 0.201
x3 0.600 0.099 0.301
where B is formed by slightly tweaking the probabilities in A. First, given π we can
compute the additive capacity of A, ML+Gl(π,A) = ref
+
π,Gl(1,A). As predicted in
[5, Thm. 6], we find that for any full-support π, the capacity is 0.6, which is indeed 1
minus the sum of the column minimums of A; moreover, the gain function that realizes
the capacity is indeed the complement of the π-reciprocal gain function. For instance,
when π = (1/3, 1/2, 1/6) it is
G x1 x2 x3
w1 −2 1 1
w2 1 −1 1
w3 1 1 −5
⊥ 0 0 0
Next, because B is so close to A, we expect that its additive refinement metric should be
small. On the uniform prior πu = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), we find indeed that ref+πu,Gl(A,B) =
10 Note that deciding whether A v B can also be done using a single linear program; but here
we achieve more: when A 6v B we know that B can leak more than A, but we want to also
compute how much more.
9
1063/255000 ≈ 0.00416863, realized on the gain function
G x1 x2 x3
w1 72/85 −88/255 8/255
w2 1 −7/3 1
w3 1 1 −7
⊥ 0 0 0
As another example, consider the following channels from [4]:
A y1 y2 y3 y4
x1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
x2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
x3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3
B z1 z2 z3
x1 0.2 0.22 0.58
x2 0.2 0.4 0.4
x3 0.35 0.4 0.25
They are interesting in that A 6v B, but it was historically difficult to find a gain function
that makes B leak more than A. On a uniform prior we find that ref+πu,Gl(A,B) =
103/13320 ≈ 0.00773273, realized on the gain function
G x1 x2 x3
w1 −107/148 409/444 19/444
w2 −1/4 1 −2/3
w3 1 −7/3 1
⊥ 0 0 0
To achieve robustness wrt any prior, we might prefer not to compute ref+π,Gl(A,B)
for some specific π, but instead to compute ref+D,Gl(A,B). But it is not clear how to do
this.
To get some partial insight, we can try an exhaustive search over all priors whose
probabilities have a denominator of 1000. We find that the best prior in that set is π =
(624/1000, 29/1000, 347/1000), which gives ref+π,Gl(A,B) = 15553/1850000 ≈ 0.00840703,
realized on gain function
G x1 x2 x3
w1 −5/7696 16/1073 4/12839
w2 57/208 1 −257/347
w3 1 −1179/29 1
⊥ 0 0 0
Hence we see that unlike the situation of additive capacity where ML+Gl(π,A) is the
same for any full support π, the additive refinement metric does depend on the prior.11
11 There is an interesting phenomenon that we have observed. Given prior π, we can first compute
the gain function g that realizes ref+
π,Gl(A,B), and then we can compute the prior that realizes
ref+D,g(A,B). In every case that we have tried, the prior that is found is exactly the π that we
started with, suggesting that π is somehow “encoded” into the gain function g.
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5 Bounding the additive refinement metric
In the previous section we showed that computing the additive refinement metric for
a fixed prior can be done by solving a single linear program. Although this gives us
a solution in time polynomial in the size of C, this solution is still practically feasible
only for very modest sizes. In this section, we study efficient techniques for bounding
the additive metric based on the Earth Mover’s distance, inspired by the use of the same
technique for computing capacity [2].
Moreover, we discuss a simple bound on the additive refinement metric when maxi-
mizing over both priors and gain functions. The existence of an efficient exact algorithm
for this case remains unknown.
5.1 The Earth Mover’s distance
The Earth Mover’s distance (EMD), also known as Wasserstein distance, is a fundamen-
tal distance between probability distributions, with numerous applications in computer
science. EMD gives a metric on the set DA of probability distributions over an under-
lying set A, equipped with its own “ground” metric d. As a consequence, it can be
thought of as a mapping W : MA →MDA, lifting a metric on A to a metric on DA.
The idea behind EMD is that the distance between two distributions α, α′:DA is the
minimum cost of transforming α into α′. The transformation is performed by moving
probability mass between elements a, a′:A, where αa is seen as the probability mass
available at a (supply), and α′a′ as the probability mass needed at a
′ (demand). The
ground metric d determines the cost of this transportation: moving a unit of probability
from a to a′ costs d(a, a′). There are many strategies for achieving this transformation,
the cost of the best one gives the distance between α and α′.
More precisely, an earth-moving strategy is a joint distribution S ∈ DA2 whose two
marginals are α and α′, i.e.
∑
a′ S(a, a
′) = αa and
∑
a Sa,a′ = α
′
a′ . Intuitively, Sa,a′ is
the probability mass moved from a to a′, and the requirements on the marginals capture
the fact that both supply and demand should be respected. We write Sα,α′ for the set of
such strategies. Moreover, we write ESd:=
∑
a,a′ Sa,a′d(a, a
′) for the expected value
of d wrt the distribution S, in other words the total transportation cost of the strategy S.
Definition 2. The Earth mover’s distance is the mapping W : MA →MDA given by:
W(d)(α, α′) := inf
S:Sα,α′
ESd .
Note that the properties of W(d) directly depend on those of d; in particular W(d) might
not be symmetric unless d itself is symmetric.
The EMD can be computed via a linear program with S as variables, since ESd is
linear on S and respecting supply and demand can be expressed by linear constraints.
However, more efficient network flow algorithms also exist (e.g. [11]). Note, however,
that some of these algorithms require d to be a proper metric.
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5.2 Bounding the refinement metric using the EMD
We now turn our attention to the problem of bounding the additive refinement metric
between two channels A and B. To do so, we exploit the view of channels as producing
hyper-distributions. Recall from §2 that the effect of a channel A on the prior π can be
viewed as a hyper-distribution [πŻA], that is a distribution on the posterior distributions
produced by each output of A. In other words, hypers have type DDX .
Since hypers are distributions, we can use the EMD to measure the distance between
them. But the EMD requires a ground metric on the underlying space, which in our case
is A = DX . In other words, to measure the distance between hypers we first need to
measure the distance between posteriors. It turns out that the appropriate distance for
our needs is the following.
Definition 3. Let π, σ:DX . Define the “convex separation” quasimetric qcs:MDX as







The usefulness of this quasimetric lies in the fact that it can be shown [5] to express
the maximum that σ, π can be separated by a 1-bounded gain function, that is
qcs(σ, π) = sup
g:GlX
q+<(Vg(σ), Vg(π)) .
This in turn means that Vg is non-expansive wrt qcs, which is important due to the
connection between EMD and the Kantorovich metric. The technicalities of this con-
struction are available in the appendix, we only state the most relevant result here.
Theorem 2. For any prior π and channels A,B it holds that
ref+π,Gl(A,B) ≤ W(qcs)([πŻA], [πŻB]) .
Hence, to obtain a bound on the refinement metric, we can compute the hypers [πŻA]
and [πŻB] (i.e. the corresponding output and posterior distributions) and then employ
either linear programming or a network flow algorithm to compute the W(qcs) distance
between them. Note that the algorithm for EMD should not require the ground metric
to be symmetric, since qcs is not.
5.3 More relaxed bounds
As discussed in the previous sections, the EMD is the cost of the best transportation
strategy to transform one distribution into another. As a consequence, one can clearly
obtain a bound by choosing any transportation strategy, not necessarily the best. That
is, if S is a strategy for transforming [πŻA] into [πŻB], then the cost (wrt qcs) of S
provides a bound to the refinement metric between A and B:
ref+π,G(A,B) ≤ ESqcs .
Of course the actual EMD gives the best such bound, but the freedom of choosing any
strategy can be convenient. In §6 an analytic bound for the Crowds protocol is given by
choosing an arbitrary strategy, without having to show that this is the optimal one.
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5.4 Maximizing over all priors
In view of the apparent difficulty of computing ref+D,Gl(A,B), we are led to wonder
how much the additive refinement bound can be increased by changing from a uniform
prior to a non-uniform prior. We find that the possible increase can be bounded:
Theorem 3. For any channel matrices A:X_Y and B:X_Z , we have
ref+D,Gl(A,B) ≤ |X | · ref
+
πu,Gl(A,B) .
Proof. Let prior π be arbitrary, and suppose that ref+π,Gl(A,B) is realized on gain
function g with matrix representation G, which we assume without loss of general-
ity to include an all-zero row. Next recall the trace-based formulation of posterior g-
vulnerability: Vg[πŻA] = maxS tr(GDπAS). Observe that we can factor Dπ = DρDπ
u
,








AS) = Vg′ [πuŻA] ,
where g′ is the gain function with matrix representation GDρ. The only problem is that
g′ may not be in GlX . It does give non-negative vulnerabilities (since GDρ contains
an all-zero row), but it may have gain values bigger than 1. We can deal with this by
scaling g′ down, dividing its gain values by maxx πx/πux = maxx πx · |X |, which is at
most |X |. If we let g′′ be the scaled-down version of g′, then we have g′′ ∈ GlX and
|X | ·Vg′′ [πuŻA] = Vg[πŻA]. Since the same equality holds for B, the desired inequality
follows. (Note that it is only an inequality, since g′′ may not be optimal for πu.) 2
Applying this theorem to the last example from §4, where the additive refinement
metric on the uniform prior was about 0.0077, we see that the metric over all priors is
at most 3 times as large, or 0.0232. While this bound is considerably larger than 0.0084
(the maximum found in our partial search), it may still be useful.
6 Case study : the Crowds protocol
Crowds is a simple protocol for anonymous web surfing. The context is that a user,
called the initiator, wants to contact a web server but does not want to disclose his
identity to the server. That is achieved by collaborating with a group of other users,
called the crowd, who participate in the protocol to facilitate the task. The protocol is
essentially a simple probabilistic routing protocol:
– In the first step, the initiator selects a user uniformly (including possibly himself)
and forwards the request to him. The user who receives the message now becomes
the (new) forwarder.
– A forwarder, upon receiving a message, flips a (biased) probabilistic coin: with
probability ϕ he forwards the message to a new user (again chosen uniformly, in-
cluding himself), but with remaining probability 1−ϕ he instead delivers the mes-
sage directly to the web server.
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If ϕ<1 then with probability 1 the message will eventually arrive at the web server,
with the expected number of hops being 1/1−ϕ.
Concerning anonymity, from the point of view of the web server all users seem
equally likely to have been the initiator (assuming a uniform prior), due to the first
step’s always being a forwarding step. The analysis becomes more interesting however
if we assume that some users in the crowd are corrupt, reporting to an adversary who is
trying to discover messages’ initiators.12
If user a forwards a message to a corrupted user, we say that a was detected. Since
a’s being detected is more likely when he is the initiator than when he is not, the proto-
col does leak information: detecting a creates a posterior where a has a greater chance
of being the initiator than he had a priori. Still, if ϕ>0 then the posterior is not a point
distribution: user a can “plead not guilty” by claiming the he was merely forwarding for
someone else. The greater ϕ is, the more plausible that claim becomes: the forwarding
probability ϕ can be seen as trading anonymity for utility (expected number of hops).
In their original work, Reiter and Rubin [12] introduced the property of “probable
innocence” to analyze Crowds, meaning, roughly speaking, that each user appears more
likely to be innocent than guilty. For our purposes, however, we study Crowds in the
context of QIF.13
6.1 Modeling the Crowds protocol
To perform an analysis of the anonymity guarantees of Crowds, we start by modeling
the protocol as an information-theoretic channel. Letting n, c, m be the number of hon-
est, corrupted, and total users respectively (i.e. n+c = m), the secret and observable
events are X := {x1, . . . , xn}, Y:= {y1, . . . , yn, s}, with xa denoting that (honest) user
a is the initiator, yb denoting that user b was detected (forwarded a message to a cor-
rupted user), and s denoting that the message was delivered to the web server without
having been forwarded to a corrupted user.
To construct the channel matrix C, we need for any honest user a to compute the
probability of producing each observable event, given the secret event xa. Due to sym-
metry, the probability of detecting the initiator, or some non-initiator, is the same for
all initiators. In other words, the probabilities p(yb|xa) only depend on whether a=b or
a 6= b, and not on the exact value of a, b. Hence the entries of C can only have 3 distinct
values, Cxa,s = α, Cxa,ya = β, and Cxa,yb = γ, a 6= b, giving the following channel
matrix:14
C =
y1 · · · yn s x1 β · · · γ α... . . .














12 This is a relatively weak adversarial model; a model in which the adversary can view any
communication in the network would be too strong for Crowds.
13 See [3] for a discussion of how probable innocence relates to QIF.
14 See [3] for the exact derivations.
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Finally, given a prior π on X , modeling how likely each user is to be the initiator
a-priori, we can quantify the anonymity of the protocol by considering its (additive or
multiplicative) g-leakage, for a properly constructed gain function g. For instance, the
identity gain function gid is a reasonable choice for this protocol, modeling an adversary
that tries to guess the initiator of the message in one try. For this choice of gain function,






Bt gid is not the only reasonable choice for this protocol. It could be argued, for in-
stance, that the whole point behind “probable innocence” is that the adversary would
not incriminate a user unless there is sufficient evidence — that is, a wrong guess should
have a penalty, compared to not guessing at all. Such adversaries can be expressed by
suitable gain functions [3].
A crucial question, then, is how can we make robust conclusions in our analysis of
information leakage, in particular when we tune a parameter of the protocol such as ϕ?
6.2 Increasing ϕ : refinement relation
A striking fact about Crowds, first observed in [8], is that its Bayes leakage for a uniform
prior, given by (3), does not depend on ϕ! This is remarkable since the fact of forward-
ing is the only reason why a detected user can plausibly pretend not be the initiator.
Intuitively, the more likely a user is to forward the more likely detecting the wrong user
becomes, so anonymity is improved. Understanding this paradox is beyond the scope
of this paper (an explanation is given in [3]), but we should note that this phenomenon
only happens in the very specific case of gid with a uniform prior: for most other priors
and gain functions, the corresponding leakage does depend on ϕ, as expected.
This brings us to the natural question: how does leakage depend on ϕ? Answering
this question is of great importance to the designer of the system who tries to optimize
the parameters, but without compromising its anonymity.
The easier case to answer is when ϕ is increased. Intuitively, this operation should
be safe, in the sense that the resulting protocol should leak no more than before. But
can we be sure that this always happens? Could it be the case that for some strange ad-
versary, modeled by some gain function g, increasing ϕ causes the leakage to increase,
leading to a less safe protocol?
The theory of refinement provides a robust answer. Let Cϕ denote the channel ma-
trix for a particular choice of ϕ. It can be shown that
Cϕ v Cϕ̃ iff ϕ ≤ ϕ̃ ,
by showing that Cϕ̃ = CϕR for a properly constructed channel R. As a consequence
Cϕ̃ is a safer protocol; it leaks no more than Cϕ for all priors and gain functions.
6.3 Decreasing ϕ : refinement metric
Although refinement establishes in a very robust way that increasing ϕ is a safe oper-
ation, it can be argued that the interesting case is exactly the opposite: decreasing ϕ.
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This is because a system designer is typically interested in improving the utility of the
system, which in this case corresponds to its latency. Since the expected number of
hops to reach the server is 1/1−ϕ, decreasing ϕ lowers the protocol’s latency, so such a
change is desirable.
However, decreasing ϕ is not always safe. Although Bayes leakage for a uniform
prior remains unaffected, we can experimentally verify that for all other priors, and
for many gain functions, the leakage indeed increases. We thus have a typical trade-
off between anonymity and utility; we might be willing to accept a less safe protocol,
and replace ϕ̃ by a smaller ϕ, if we knew that the increase in leakage cannot exceed a
certain threshold. Can we answer this question in a robust way?
Using the refinement metric. The refinement metric provides a natural answer to our
question. For a fixed π, we know that ref+π,Gl(C
ϕ̃,Cϕ) gives the maximum increase in
vulnerability when we replace ϕ̃ by ϕ, for any 1-bounded gain function g:Gl.
The metric can be computed using the linear programming technique of §4). As an
example, for n = 110, c = 5, ϕ = 0.55 and ϕ̃ = 0.6 we find that the refinement metric
is approximately 0.0076. This means that lowering the probability of forwarding from
0.6 to 0.55 cannot have a huge effect on the vulnerability; for instance if the adversary’s
probability of a correct guess (Bayes vulnerability) was p, it can be at most p+ 0.0076
after the change. Note that ϕ = 0.55 gives 12.5% lower latency compared to ϕ = 0.6,
so we might decide that the benefit outweighs the risk.
If computing the exact metric is not feasible, we might still be able to apply the
EMD bound discussed in §5, given by the EMD (wrt qcs) between the hypers [πuŻC
ϕ̃]
and [πuŻCϕ]. In our example, this is approximately 0.017; it is more than twice as large
as the real metric, but it still provides a useful bound on the loss of anonymity.
An analytic bound for Crowds. As discussed in §5, an upper bound to the refinement
metric can be obtained by computing, not the actual EMD, but the cost (wrt qcs) of any
transportation strategy from [πŻCϕ̃] to [πŻCϕ]. For the uniform prior, [πuŻCϕ] can be
computed analytically; then we can choose any strategy to obtain an analytic bound.
Following the calculations of [3], the hyper distribution [πuŻCϕ] has
output distribution ρ = (1−α/n, · · · , 1−α/n, α) ,
and posteriors δyb = (
ϕ
m








, · · · , ϕ
m
) ,
δs = (1/n, · · · , 1/n) .
Note that the detection events yb produce a posterior δyb assigning higher prob-
ability to the detected user b, while s provides no information, producing a uniform
posterior. Denoting by α̃, ρ̃, . . . the corresponding quantities for ϕ̃ ≥ ϕ, we can check
that α̃ ≤ α; hence ρ̃ has lower probability than ρ on its last element and higher on
its first n elements. A reasonable transportation strategy15 S from [πŻCϕ̃] to [πŻCϕ] is
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Fig. 1. Refinement metric, EMD and analytic bounds for Crowds
then to move all probability mass from δ̃s to δs, while splitting the probability of δ̃yb
between δyb and δs. This strategy produces the following bound.
Theorem 4. For any 0 < ϕ ≤ ϕ̃ ≤ 1 it holds that:
ref+πu,Gl(C
ϕ̃,Cϕ) ≤ (1− α)(1− ϕ
ϕ̃






Experimental evaluation All techniques presented in this paper have been imple-
mented in the libqif library [1]. An experimental evaluation of the additive refinement
metric for Crowds is shown in Fig. 1. On the left-hand side, we compute the exact met-
ric as well as the EMD bound between two instances of Crowds with ϕ = 0.55 and
ϕ̃ = 0.6, for a uniform prior, c = 5 corrupted users, while varying the number of hon-
est users n. We see that as n increases ref+πu,Gl(C
ϕ̃,Cϕ) becomes small, guaranteeing
that the decrease of ϕ has limited effect on the leakage. The EMD bound is not tight,
but as n increases it becomes small enough to provide meaningful guarantees.
Computing the exact metric was possible for up to n = 130 within a computation
threshold of 10 minutes. Computing the EMD bound, on the other hand, was feasible
for much larger sizes. On the right-hand side of Fig. 1 we show both the EMD and the
analytic bound of the previous section, for the same example, but for larger numbers of
users and c = 70. The two bounds coincide, suggesting that the transportation strategy
chosen for the analytic bound is likely the optimal one. We were able to compute the
EMD bound for up to n = 1800, while the analytic bound is applicable to any size.
Note that, although the exact refinement metric is unknown, the bounds are sufficiently
small to provide meaningful guarantees about the anonymity of the protocol.
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A Proofs of Section 5
In this section we provide the proof of the main result of Section 5.
A.1 The Kantorovich distance
The Kantorovich metric plays a fundamental role in our bounding technique. Given
metrics dA : MA, dB ∈MB, a function f : A → B is called Lipschitz wrt dA, dB iff
dB(f(a), f(a
′)) ≤ dA(a, a′) for all a, a′ ∈ A .
Let CdA,dBA denote the set of all such functions.
The standard Kantorovich construction transforms metrics on some setA, to metrics
on DX , i.e. metrics measuring the distance between two probability distributions onA.
Formally, it is the lifting K : MA →MDA given by
K(d)(α, α′) := sup
F :Cd,dRA
|EαF − Eα′F | .
Note the two uses of the Euclidean distance dR in the above definition: first, we consider
Lipschitz functions wrt to d (the metric being lifted) and dR; second, we use dR to
compare the expected values of these functions.
For the purposes of bounding the refinement metric, it is more convenient to use a
quasimetric variant of Kantorovich, in which dR is replaced by q+< .
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Definition 4. The Kantorovich quasimetric is the mapping K+ : MA → MDA given
by:
K+(d)(α, α′) := sup
F :Cd,q+< A
q+<(EαF, Eα′F ) = sup
F :Cd,q+< A
Eα′F − EαF .
Note that the max in the definition of q+< is removed since the sup is anyway non-
negative.
An important property of the Kantorovich metric is its dual formulation as the Earth
Mover’s distance W(d) (Def. 2, also known as Wasserstein metric). The well-known
Kantorovich-Rubinstein theorem states that K(d) = W(d) (when d is a proper metric
and satisfies further assumptions, see below). In our case, however, we use K+ instead
of K, and moreover we apply it to distances d that are not symmetric. It turns out that the
full Kantorovich-Rubinstein theorem still holds in our case (under the same conditions).
Theorem 5 (Kantorovich-Rubinstein, extended). Let A be a Polish (i.e. complete
and separable) metric space, let d be a lower semi-continuous distance function on A
satisfying reflexivity and the triangle inequality. Then K+(d) = W(d).
Proof. In [13, Thm. 1.3, page 19], a “Kantorovich duality” is proven, involving generic
(lower semi-continuous) cost functions. Then, Kantorovich-Rubinstein is retrieved as a
spacial case when the cost function is a metric [13, Thm. 1.14, page 34]. In the proof
of the latter (which is quite short), only the reflexivity and the triangle inequality of d
are used. Moreover, the change of dR to q+< in the definition of K+ does not affect the
proof. 2
A surprising consequence of the above result is that, under the assumptions of
Kantorovich-Rubinstein, we have:
K+(d) = K(d) = W(d) .
Note that the classes of Lipschitz functions in K+ an K are different, still maximizing
over them turns out to give the same result! So, although the formulation of K+ is
essential for computing capacity (see the next section), in fact it gives the standard
Kantorovich construction.
A.2 Using Kantorovich/EMD to bound the refinement metric
The connection between Kantorovich and EMD allows us to obtain a bound on the
refinement metric. To do so, we use the fact that posterior vulnerability, for any 1-
bounded gain function, is non-expansive wrt convex separation quasimetric (Def. 3).
Lemma 1 ([5]). For any g ∈ GlX , Vg is Lipschitz wrt qcs, dR .
Since Kantorovich distance is given by maximizing over any Lipschitz function, it
clearly gives an upper bound on the refinement metric. And the connection between
Kantorovich and EMD allows us to efficiently compute this bound.
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Theorem 2. For any prior π and channels A,B it holds that
ref+π,Gl(A,B) ≤ W(qcs)([πŻA], [πŻB]) .
Proof. From Lemma 1 we get that ref+π,Gl(A,B) ≤ K
+(qcs)([πŻA], [πŻB]), and the
result follows from the (extended) Kantorovich-Rubinstein theorem.
